

Self Evaluation of PSEC: Provably Secure Elliptic Curve Encryption Scheme

Abstract

This document evaluates the security and performance of a public-key cryptosystem, PSEC (Provably Secure Elliptic Curve Encryption Scheme), which has three versions: PSEC-1, PSEC-2 and PSEC-3.

1 Security

1.1 Summary

1. If the elliptic curve decision Diffie-Hellman (EC-DDH) assumption (see the next section) is true, PSEC-1 is secure in the strongest sense under the random oracle model. Here, security in the strongest sense means to be semantically secure or non-malleable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2 or NM-CCA2).
2. If the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (EC-DH) assumption is true, PSEC-2 with one-time padding (PSEC-2-OTP) is secure in the strongest sense under the random oracle model.
3. If the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (EC-DH) assumption is true and the underlying symmetric-key encryption is secure against passive attacks, PSEC-2 with the symmetric-key encryption (PSEC-2-SymE) is secure in the strongest sense under the random oracle model.

The advantage of this scheme is that security in the strongest sense is guaranteed for the total system that integrates the asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes. Therefore, even if the underlying symmetric-key encryption is secure only against passive attacks and not against active attacks, PSEC-2, overall, guarantees security against active attacks.

An additional property of PSEC-2 is authentication without using MAC function. That is, the recipient can confirm whether the decrypted message is the same as the one the originator sent.

4. If the elliptic curve gap Diffie-Hellman (EC-Gap-DH) assumption is true, PSEC-3 with one-time padding (PSEC-3-OTP) is secure in the strongest sense under the random oracle model.
 5. If the elliptic curve gap Diffie-Hellman (EC-Gap-DH) assumption is true and the underlying symmetric-key encryption is secure against passive attacks, PSEC-3 with the symmetric-key encryption (PSEC-3-SymE) is secure in the strongest sense under the random oracle model.
- PSEC-3 has the same additional merits as those of PSEC-2.

1.2 Comparison with Other Schemes

This section compares the security of PSEC-1/2/3 with other encryption schemes such as OAEP-RSA, ACE and EC-ElGamal. Table 1 summarizes the comparison of security.

Table 1: Comparison of Security

Scheme	Provably Secure? (IND-CCA2?)	Number-theoretical assumption	Functional assumption
PSEC-1	Yes	EC-PDDH	Truly random
PSEC-2(OTP)	Yes	EC-DH	Truly random
PSEC-3(OTP)	Yes	EC-GDH	Truly random
EC-Cramer-Shoup	Yes	EC-DDH	UOWHF
OAEP-RSA	Yes	RSA	Truly random
PKCS#1 Ver.1	No	–	–

DDH denotes the decision Diffie-Hellman, and EC-DH, EC-PDDH and EC-GDH denote the elliptic curve versions of Diffie-Hellman, partial decision Diffie-Hellman and Gap-Diffie-Hellman assumptions. (OTP) denotes a scheme which employs the one-time-pad as symmetric encryption.

1.3 Theoretical Results

This section shows our results on the security of PSEC-1, PSEC-2 and PSEC-3. They are easily obtained from the results presented in [6, 7, 10, 11].

Definition 1.1 (EC-PDDH assumption) *Let \mathcal{G} be the key generator of PSEC-1, and (q, a, b, p, P) be a part of the public-key. Let s, t and u be uniformly selected in $\mathbf{Z}/p\mathbf{Z}$. $Q := sP$, $R := tP$, $V := stP$, and $W := uP$. Let $b \in \{0, 1\}$ be uniformly selected, and $X := V$ if $b = 0$, and $X := W$ if $b = 1$.*

The elliptic curve partial decision Diffie-Hellman (EC-PDDH) problem is intractable, if for any (uniform/ non-uniform) probabilistic polynomial time ma-

chine Adv , for any constant c , for sufficiently large $k(= pLen)$,

$$\Pr[Adv(q, a, b, p, P, Q, R, X) = b] < 1/2 + 1/k^c.$$

The probability is taken over the coin flips of \mathcal{G} and Adv .

The assumption that the elliptic curve partial decision Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable is called the elliptic curve partial decision Diffie-Hellman (PDDH) assumption.

Definition 1.2 (EC-DDH Assumption) Let \mathcal{G} be the setup algorithm of PSEC-3, and (q, a, b, p, P) be a part of the common parameters. Let r, s and t be uniformly selected in $\mathbf{Z}/p\mathbf{Z}$, and set $R := r \cdot P, S := s \cdot P, T := t \cdot P$ and $U := rs \cdot P$. Let b be a random coin. If $b = 0$, set $v \leftarrow x_T$, otherwise set $v \leftarrow x_U$.

The Elliptic Curve Decision Diffie-Hellman (EC-DDH) problem is intractable, if for any probabilistic polynomial time machine A , for any constant c , for sufficiently large $k(= pLen)$,

$$\Pr[A(q, a, b, p, P, R, S, v) = b] < 1/2 + 1/k^c.$$

The probability is taken over the coin flips of \mathcal{G} and A as well as the random choice of r, s, t and b .

The assumption that the Elliptic Curve Decision Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable is called the Elliptic Curve Decision Diffie-Hellman (EC-DDH) assumption.

Definition 1.3 (EC-DH Assumption) Let \mathcal{G} be a key generator of PSEC-2, and (q, a, b, p, P) is a part of the public-key. Let s and t be uniformly selected in $\mathbf{Z}/p\mathbf{Z}$. $Q := sP, R := tP$, and $V := stP$.

The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (EC-DH) problem is intractable, if for any (uniform/non-uniform) probabilistic polynomial time machine Adv , for any constant c , for sufficiently large $k(= pLen)$,

$$\Pr[Adv(q, a, b, p, P, Q, R) = V] < 1/k^c.$$

The probability is taken over the coin flips of \mathcal{G} and Adv .

The assumption that the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable is called the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (EC-DH) assumption.

Definition 1.4 (EC-GDH Assumption) The Elliptic Curve Gap Diffie-Hellman (EC-GDH) problem is intractable, if the EC-DH problem is still intractable even for an adversary who has access to an oracle that perfectly answers the EC-DDH problem.

The assumption that the Elliptic Curve Gap Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable is called the Elliptic Curve Gap Diffie-Hellman (EC-GDH) assumption.

Definition 1.5 (SPA(SymE)) Let Adv be an adversary that runs in two stages. In the first stage, Adv endeavors to come up with a pair of equal-length messages, m_0 and m_1 , along with some state information s , where $|m_0| = |m_1| \leq$

$(gLen)^a$ (a : constant). In the second stage, Adv is given a ciphertext $y := \text{SymEnc}(key, m_b)$, where $key \in \{0, 1\}^{gLen}$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$ are randomly and uniformly chosen.

SymE is secure against passive attacks (SPA), if for any (uniform/non-uniform) probabilistic polynomial time machine Adv , for any constant c , for sufficiently large $gLen$,

$$\Pr[Adv(gLen, m_0, m_1, s, y) = b] < 1/2 + 1/(gLen)^c.$$

The probability is taken over the coin flips of (key, b) and Adv .

Theorem 1.6 (PSEC-1) Let $rLen \geq c_0 pLen$ (c_0 : constant) and $hLen = pLen - 1$. PSEC-1 is semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) or non-malleable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (NM-CCA2) in the random oracle model, provided that the EC-DDH assumption is true.

Theorem 1.7 (PSEC-2-OTP) Let SymE for PSEC-2 be the one-time padding. Let $rLen = qLen - 1$, and $hLen = pLen - 1$. PSEC-2 is semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) or non-malleable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (NM-CCA2) in the random oracle model, provided that the EC-DH assumption is true.

Theorem 1.8 (PSEC-2-SymE) Let $rLen = qLen - 1$, and $hLen = pLen - 1$. PSEC-2 is semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) or non-malleable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (NM-CCA2) in the random oracle model, provided that the EC-DH assumption is true and that the underlying SymE is secure against passive attacks (IND-PAS).

Theorem 1.9 (PSEC-3-OTP) Let SymE be the one-time pad, and thus $mLen = kLen$. Let $hLen = pLen/a$ for some constant a . PSEC-3-OTP is chosen-ciphertext secure in the random oracle model, provided that the EC-GDH assumption holds.

Theorem 1.10 (PSEC-3-SymE) Let $hLen = pLen/a$ for some constant a . PSEC-3-SymE is chosen-ciphertext secure in the random oracle model, provided that the EC-GDH assumption holds and that the underlying SymE is secure against passive attacks, for suitable $kLen$ and $mLen$.

Remark: We can also give the concrete efficiency analysis of the reduction for proving the security, and show that our reduction is efficient [6, 7].

2 Performance as Implemented

2.1 Performance in Hardware

- **Process:**
Cell base.

- **Design environment:**
Verilog-XL + DesignCompiler
- **Resource:**
About 25.6KG(@ 2NAND areal equality) + Memory(13312bit)
Structure: [Random logic+Multiplier×2+Adder] + [Memory(13312bit)]
- **Speed:**
Evaluation speed in 30MHz clock. (Measured by simulator)

PSEC-1		PSEC-2		PSEC-3	
Encryption	45 ms	Encryption	45 ms	Encryption	45 ms
Decryption	45 ms	Decryption	45 ms	Decryption	23 ms

(Assuming key length = 160 bit.)

2.2 Performance in Software

- **Platform:**
CPU: Pentium with MMX 266MHz
OS: Turbo Linux version 4.0
- **Language:**
C Language (gcc version 2.91.60)
gnu mp (gmp version 3.0.1) for large integer calculation
- **Memory size(Code size):**

PSEC-1		PSEC-2	
Encryption	63.34 Kbytes	Encryption	65.61 Kbytes
Decryption	63.18 Kbytes	Decryption	65.97 Kbytes

PSEC-3	
Encryption	65.69 Kbytes
Decryption	65.89 Kbytes

- **Memory size(Work size):**

PSEC-1		PSEC-2	
Encryption	1032 Kbytes	Encryption	988 Kbytes
Decryption	1028 Kbytes	Decryption	1068 Kbytes

PSEC-3	
Encryption	1056 Kbytes
Decryption	780 Kbytes

- **Process speed:**

PSEC-1		PSEC-2	
Encryption	76.4 ms	Encryption	77.1 ms
Decryption	70.6 ms	Decryption	72.0 ms
PSEC-3			
Encryption	77.3 ms		
Decryption	35.8 ms		

(Assuming key length = 160 bit.)

- **Data size:**

$pLen$	160 bits
$qLen$	160 bits
$hLen$	160 bits
$gLen$	160 bits
Size of plaintext	128 bits
Size of public key file	176 bytes
Size of secret key file	48 bytes
Size of ciphertext file	89 bytes(PSEC-1) / 105 bytes(PSEC-2) / 125 bytes(PSEC-3)

- **Optimize level:**

We use compile option “gcc -O3.”

This evaluation is a result of executing sample program in <http://www.nttmcl.com/sec>.

We can accelerate elliptic curve scalar multiplication by using window method or some other techniques. In this evaluation, we only used simple binary method.

Then, we can implement more faster program than the sample code.

3 Comparison of Computational Efficiency with Other Schemes

This section compares the efficiency of PSEC with those of other encryption schemes, EC-ElGamal and EC-Cramer-Shoup.

To compare the schemes under the equal conditions, we assume that the plaintext size is 128 bits for all schemes, since public-key encryption schemes are usually employed for key distribution of a symmetric-key encryption (128 key is the most typical key size of symmetric-key encryptions).

We then assume the following parameter sizes for PSEC-1/2/3. The field size ($qLen$) and the size of the order of the base point ($pLen$) are 160 bits. For PSEC-1, random string length ($rLen$) is 32 bits, and hashed value length ($hLen$) is 160 bits. As for PSEC-2-OTP, random string length ($rLen$) is 160 bits, hashed value lengths ($gLen$ and $hLen$) are 128 bits and 160 bits. PSEC-3-OTP assumes that hashed value lengths ($gLen$ and $hLen$) are 128 bits.

The parameter sizes for EC-ElGamal and EL-Cramer-Shoup are assumed to be the same as those of PSEC.

In our estimation, we assume standard (extended) binary methods for all schemes. We ignore the minor terms such as the complexities of hash function evaluations and exclusive-or operations.

For estimating the lengths of keys and ciphertexts, we ignore the lengths of the common parameters among users such as elliptic curve parameters, and other minor terms such as parameter size information.

The following table summarizes the comparison of efficiency.

Table 2: Comparison of Efficiency

Scheme	Encryption ($\#M(160)$)	Decryption ($\#M(160)$)	Key Length ($ q $) (bits)	Ciphertext Length(bits)
PSEC-1	480	480	160	320
PSEC-2(OTP)	480	480	160	448
PSEC-3(OTP)	480	240	160	576
EC-ElGamal	480	240	160	320
EC-Cramer-Shoup	1000	520	480	608

Here, $\#A(160)$ denotes the number of executions of the elliptic curve addition over a finite field with 160 bit size.

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Appendix

OCAC: an Optimal Conversion for Asymmetric Cryptosystems

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Abstract

Five years after the optimal asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP) which makes chosen-ciphertext secure encryption scheme from any trapdoor one-way permutation (but whose unique application is RSA), this paper presents OCAC, an optimal conversion which applies to any weakly secure cryptosystem: the overhead is negligible, since it just consists, as with OAEP, of two hashings for both encryption and decryption. Furthermore, advantages of OCAC beyond OAEP are numerous:

1. it is more general than OAEP, since it can apply to any partially trapdoor one-way function (RSA and modular square, but also Diffie-Hellman, Higher Residues, etc);
2. it is possible to integrate symmetric encryption (block and stream ciphers) to reach very high speed rates;
3. it also provides a key distribution with session key encryption which achieves chosen-ciphertext security with an only semantically secure symmetric scheme.

Therefore, OCAC could become a new alternative to OAEP, and even reach security relative to factorization.

In addition, in order to clarify the security requirement of the underlying asymmetric encryption, this paper introduces a novel class of computational problems, the *gap problems*, which is considered to be dual to the class of the *decision problems*. We show the relationship among inverting problems (*e.g.*, computational-DH problem), decision problems (*e.g.*, decision-DH problem), and gap problems (*e.g.*, gap-DH problem).

1 Introduction

For a long time many conversions from a weakly secure encryption into a chosen-ciphertext secure cryptosystem have been attempted, with variable success. Such a goal is of greatest interest since many one-way encryption schemes are known, with variable efficiency and various properties, whereas chosen-ciphertext secure schemes are very rare.

1.1 Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Cryptosystems

Until few years ago, the description of a cryptosystem, together with some heuristic arguments for security, were enough to convince and to make a scheme to be widely adopted. Formal semantic security [15] and further non-malleability [11] were just seen as theoretical properties. However, after multiple cryptanalyses

of international standards [5, 8, 7], provable security has been realized to be important and even became a basic requirement for any new cryptographic protocol. Therefore, for the last two years, many cryptosystems have been proposed. Some furthermore introduced new problems [17, 21, 18, 23, 26], other are intricate constructions, over old schemes, to reach chosen-ciphertext security (from El Gamal [33, 32, 9, 1, 20], Okamoto-Uchiyama [22], D-RSA [25] or Paillier [24]), with specific security proofs.

Indeed, it is easy to describe a one-way cryptosystem from any trapdoor problem. Furthermore, such trapdoor problems are not so rare (Diffie-Hellman [10], factorization, RSA [29], elliptic curves, McEliece [16], etc). A very nice result would be a generic and *efficient* conversion from any such trapdoor problem into a chosen-ciphertext secure encryption scheme.

1.2 Related Work

In 1994, Bellare and Rogaway [3] suggested such a conversion, the so-called OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding). However, its application domain was restricted to trapdoor *permutations*, which is a very rare object (RSA seems to be the only one application). Nevertheless, it provided the most efficient RSA-variant, the OAEP-RSA scheme, provably chosen-ciphertext secure, and became the new RSA standard – PKCS #1 [30].

At PKC '99, Fujisaki and Okamoto [13] proposed another conversion with further improvements [14, 27]. It therefore seemed that the expected goal was reached: a generic conversion from any one-way cryptosystem into a chosen-ciphertext secure encryption scheme. However, the resulting scheme is not optimal, from the computational point of view. Namely, the decryption phase is more heavy than one could expect, since it requires a re-encryption.

As a consequence, with those conversions, one cannot expect to obtain a scheme with an easy decryption phase (unless both encryption and decryption are easy, which is very unlikely). However, decryption is usually implemented on a smart card, hence efficient decryption process is a challenge with a practical impact.

1.3 Achievement: a New and Optimal Conversion

The present work provides a new conversion which is optimal in both the encryption and decryption phases. Indeed, the encryption needs an evaluation of the one-way function, and the decryption just makes one call to the inverting function. Further light computations are to be done, but just an XOR and two hashings. Moreover, many interesting features appear with integration of symmetric encryption schemes.

The aim of the new conversion is very natural: it roughly first encrypts a session key using the asymmetric scheme, and then encrypts the plaintext with any symmetric encryption scheme, which is *semantically-secure* under simple passive attacks (possibly the one-time pad), using the session key as secret

key. Of course this simple and actually used scheme does not reach chosen-ciphertext security, but just making the session key more unpredictable and adding a checksum, it can be made so:

$$C = \mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(R) \quad (1)$$

$$K = G(R) \quad (2)$$

$$\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}(m) = C \parallel \mathcal{E}_K^{\text{sym}}(m) \parallel H(C, R, m), \quad (3)$$

where G and H are any hash functions.

Moreover, if one uses a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme against basic passive attacks (no known-plaintext attacks), the last part of the ciphertext, which is very fast since it only makes calls to a hash function and to a symmetric encryption, can be used more than once, with many messages. This makes a highly secure use of a session key, with symmetric encryption \mathcal{E}^{sym} which initially just meets a very weak security property:

$$C = \mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(R)$$

$$K = G(R)$$

$$\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}(m_i) = C \parallel \mathcal{E}_K^{\text{sym}}(m_i) \parallel H(C, R, m_i) \text{ for } i = 1, \dots$$

1.4 Outline of the Paper

We first review, in Section 2, the security notions about encryption schemes (both symmetric and asymmetric) required in the rest of the paper, with namely the semantic security. Then, in the next section (Section 3), we describe a new attack scenario, we call the Plaintext-Checking Attack. In Section 4, we develop a novel class of problems, the Gap-Problems. Then in Section 5, we describe our new Optimal Conversion together with the security proofs, relative to the above gap-problems. The next section (Section 6) presents some interesting applications of this conversion. Then comes the conclusion.

2 Security Notions for Encryption Schemes

2.1 Asymmetric Encryption Schemes

In this part, we formally define public-key encryption schemes, together with the security notions.

Definition 2.1 (Asymmetric Encryption Schemes) *An asymmetric encryption scheme, on a message space \mathcal{M} , consists of 3 algorithms $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{asym}})$:*

- the key generation algorithm $\mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}(1^k)$ outputs a random pair of secret-public keys (sk, pk) , relatively to the security parameter k ;
- the encryption algorithm $\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(m; r)$ outputs a ciphertext c corresponding to the plaintext $m \in \mathcal{M}$ (using the random coins $r \in \Omega$);

- the decryption algorithm $\mathcal{D}_{\text{sk}}^{\text{asym}}(c)$ outputs the plaintext m associated to the ciphertext c .

Remark:

As written above, $\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(m; r)$ denotes the encryption of a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ using the random coins $r \in \Omega$. When the random coins are useless in the discussion, we simply note $\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(m)$.

The basic security notion required from an encryption scheme is the *one-wayness*, which roughly means that, from the ciphertext, one cannot recover the whole plaintext.

Definition 2.2 (One-Way) *An asymmetric encryption scheme is said to be one-way if no polynomial-time attacker can recover the whole plaintext from a given ciphertext with non-negligible probability. More formally, an asymmetric encryption scheme is said (t, ε) -INV if for any adversary \mathcal{A} with running time bounded by t , its inverting probability is less than ε :*

$$\text{Succ}^{\text{inv}} = \Pr[(\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}(1^k), m \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{M}, r \xleftarrow{R} \Omega : \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(m; r)) = m] < \varepsilon.$$

A by now more and more required property is the *semantic security* [15] also known as *indistinguishability of encryptions* or *polynomial security* since it is the computational version of perfect security [31].

Definition 2.3 (Semantic Security) *An asymmetric encryption scheme is said to be semantically secure if no polynomial-time attacker can learn any bit of information about the plaintext from the ciphertext, excepted the length. More formally, an asymmetric encryption scheme is said (t, ε, ℓ) -IND if for any adversary $\mathcal{A} = (A_1, A_2)$ with running time bounded by t ,*

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{ind}} = 2 \cdot \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}(1^k) \\ (m_0, m_1, s) \leftarrow A_1(\text{pk}), \\ b \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}, r \xleftarrow{R} \Omega, c \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(m_b; r) \end{array} : A_2(c, s) = b \right] - 1 < \varepsilon,$$

where m_0 and m_1 are both ℓ -bit long.

Both notions are denoted INV and IND respectively in the following.

Another security notion has been defined, called *non-malleability* [11]. It roughly means that it is impossible to derive, from a given ciphertext, a new ciphertext such that the plaintexts are meaningfully related. But we won't detail it since this notion has been proven equivalent to semantic security against parallel attacks [4].

Indeed, the adversary considered above may obtain, in some situations, more informations than just the public key. With just the public key, we say that she plays a *chosen-plaintext attack* since she can encrypt any plaintext of her choice, thanks to the public key. It is denoted CPA. But she may, for some time, access a decryption oracle. She then plays a *chosen-ciphertext attack*, which is either *non-adaptive* [19] if this access is limited in time, or *adaptive* [28] if this access

is unlimited, and the adversary can therefore ask any query of her choice to the decryption oracle, but of course she is restricted not to use it on the challenge ciphertext.

It has already been proven [2] that under this latter attack, the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, denoted CCA, the semantic security and the non-malleability notions are equivalent, and is the strongest security notion that one could expect. We therefore call this security level in this scenario the *chosen-ciphertext security*.

2.2 Symmetric Encryption Schemes

In this part, we briefly focus on symmetric encryption schemes.

Definition 2.4 (Symmetric Encryption Schemes) *A symmetric encryption scheme, on a message space \mathcal{M} , consists of 3 algorithms $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{sym}})$:*

- *the key generation algorithm $\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}(1^k)$ outputs a random key k , relatively to the security parameter k ;*
- *the encryption algorithm $\mathcal{E}_k^{\text{sym}}(m)$ outputs a ciphertext c corresponding to the plaintext $m \in \mathcal{M}$, in a deterministic way;*
- *the decryption algorithm $\mathcal{D}_k^{\text{sym}}(c)$ gives back the plaintext m associated to the ciphertext c .*

As for asymmetric encryption, impossibility for any adversary to get back the whole plaintext just given the ciphertext is the basic requirement. However, we directly consider *semantic security*.

Definition 2.5 (Semantic Security) *A symmetric encryption scheme is said to be semantically secure if no polynomial-time attacker can learn any bit of information about the plaintext from the ciphertext, excepted the length. More formally, a symmetric encryption scheme is said (t, ε, ℓ) -IND if for any adversary $\mathcal{A} = (A_1, A_2)$ with running time bounded by t ,*

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{ind}} = 2 \times \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{sk} \leftarrow \mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}(1^k) \\ (m_0, m_1, s) \leftarrow A_1(k), \quad : A_2(c, s) = b \\ b \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}, c \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_k^{\text{sym}}(m_b) \end{array} \right] - 1 < \varepsilon,$$

where m_0 and m_1 are both ℓ -bit long.

In the basic scenario, the adversary just sees some ciphertexts, but nothing else. However, many stronger scenarios can also be considered. The first which seemed natural for public-key cryptosystems are the known/chosen-plaintext attacks, where the adversary sees some plaintext-ciphertext pairs with the plaintext possibly chosen by herself. These attacks are not trivial in the symmetric encryption setting, since the adversary is unable to encrypt herself.

The stronger scenario considers the adaptive chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attacks, where the adversary has access to both an encryption and a decryption oracle.

However, just the security against the basic no-plaintext/ciphertext attacks (a.k.a. passive attacks) is enough in our application. Therefore, one can remark that it is a very weak requirement. Indeed, if one considers AES candidates, cryptanalysts even fail in breaking efficiently semantic security using adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks: with respect to pseudo-random permutations, semantic security is equivalent to say that the family $(\mathcal{E}_k^{\text{sym}})_k$ is (t, ε) -indistinguishable from the uniform distribution on all the permutations over $\{0, 1\}^\ell$, after just one query (*cf.* universal hash functions [6])!

Remark:

One should remark that the one-time pad provides a perfect semantically secure symmetric encryption: if $\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}(1^k)$ outputs k -bit long secret key, then for any t it is $(t, 0, k)$ -semantically secure.

3 The Plaintext-Checking Attacks

We have recalled above all the classical security notions together with the classical scenarios of attacks in the asymmetric setting. A new kind of attacks (parallel attacks) has been recently defined [4], which have no real practical meaning, but the goal was just to deal with non-malleability. In this paper, we define a new one, where the adversary can check whether a message-ciphertext pair (m, c) is valid: the *Plaintext-Checking Attack*.

Definition 3.1 (Plaintext-Checking Attack) *The attacker has access to a Plaintext-Checking Oracle which takes as input a plaintext m and a ciphertext c and outputs 1 or 0 whether c encrypts m or not.*

It is clear that such an oracle is less powerful than a decryption oracle. This scenario will be denoted by PCA, and will be always assumed to be fully adaptive: the attacker has always access to this oracle without any restriction: she can even include the challenge ciphertext in the query. Therefore, it is clear that semantic security under this attack cannot be reached. But we don't mind, since we just require a scheme to be *one-way* in this scenario. It is a very weak notion.

Remark:

One can remark that any deterministic INV-CPA asymmetric encryption scheme is clearly still INV-PCA. Namely, any trapdoor one-way permutation provides a INV-PCA-secure encryption scheme (*e.g.* RSA [29]).

4 Gap Problems

The attacking problem under the above-mentioned *Plaintext-Checking Attack* can be characterized by a novel class of computational problems, the *gap problems*.

We first define the gap problems as well as the related inverting and decision problems. Then we give some examples.

4.1 Definitions

Let $f : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}$ be any binary relation. The two classical problems are the following:

- the *inverting problem* of f is, given x , to compute any y such as $f(x, y) = 1$ if it exists, or to answer **Fail**.
- the *decision problem* (type 1) of f is, given a pair (x, y) , to decide whether $f(x, y) = 1$ or not.
- the *decision problem* (type 2) of f is, given x , to decide whether there exists some y such that $f(x, y) = 1$ or not.

In this section, we define the *gap problems*.

Definition 4.1 (Gap Problem) *The gap problem (type 1 or 2) of f is to solve the inverting problem of f with the help of the oracle of f 's decision problem (type 1 or 2, respectively).*

Let us also define some notations:

- a problem X is *tractable* if it can be solved with non-negligible probability by some probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine.
- a problem X is *strongly tractable* if it can be solved with overwhelming probability by some probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine.

Therefore, we have the negation:

- a problem X is *intractable* if it is not *tractable*
- a problem X is *weakly intractable* if it is not *strongly tractable*.

Finally, to compare the difficulty of problems, we use the notion of polynomial reductions:

- a problem X is *reducible* to problem Y if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time oracle Turing machine A^Y (with oracle of problem Y) to compute X with non-negligible probability.
- a problem X is *strongly reducible* to problem Y if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time oracle Turing machine A^Y (with oracle of problem Y) to compute X with overwhelming probability.

We can easily obtain the following proposition,

Proposition 4.2 *Let f be any binary relation.*

- If the gap problem of f is tractable (resp. strongly tractable), the inverting problem of f is reducible (resp. strongly reducible) to the decision problem of f .
- Let us assume that all the defined problems, based on f , are uniformly easy or difficult. If the decision problem of f is strongly tractable, the inverting problem of f is reducible to the gap problem of f .

Proof:

The first claim directly comes from the definition of the gap problem. Let us consider the second claim, with a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine A that solves the decision problem of f , with overwhelming probability. Let us also assume that we have a probabilistic polynomial time oracle Turing machine B^D that solves the inverting problem of f with the help of a decision oracle D . Since A solves the decision problem with overwhelming probability, it perfectly simulates the D oracle, after polynomially many queries, with non-negligible probability. In these cases, the machine B can invert. [QED] ¶

This proposition implies a duality between the gap and decision problems. In other words, the reasonability (or weakness) of the intractability assumptions of the gap and decision problems of f are comparable, unless one of them is shown to be tractable.

4.2 The Random Self-Reducible Problems

Definition 4.3 *A problem is said random self-reducible if any instance can be transformed in an other uniformly distributed instance whose solution helps in solving the initial instance.*

Such problems are clearly uniformly easy or difficult Problems. Furthermore, the weak intractability is equivalent to the classical intractability.

Corollary 4.4 *Let f be any random self-reducible binary relation.*

- If the gap problem of f is tractable, the inverting problem of f is reducible to the decision problem of f .
- If the decision problem of f is tractable, the inverting problem of f is reducible to the gap problem of f .

Remark:

Almost all the classical problems used in cryptography are *random self-reducible*.

4.3 Examples of Gap Problems

Let us review some of these classical problems, with their gap variations.

Definition 4.5 (The Diffie-Hellman Problems) *Let us consider any group G of order q together with a generator g . We define three problems as follows:*

- The Inverting Diffie-Hellman Problem (*a.k.a. the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem*): *given a pair (g^a, g^b) , find the element $C = g^{ab}$.*
- The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem: *given a triple (g^a, g^b, g^c) , decide whether $c = ab \pmod q$ or not.*
- The Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem: *given a pair (g^a, g^b) , find the element $C = g^{ab}$ with the help of a Decision Diffie-Hellman Oracle (which answers whether a given triple is correct or not).*

Note that these decision and gap problems are of type 1, where

$$f((A, B), C) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left(\log_g C \stackrel{?}{=} \log_g A \times \log_g B \pmod q \right),$$

which is *a priori* not a polynomially computable function.

Definition 4.6 (The Gap-DH Assumption) *For any probabilistic polynomial oracle Turing machine which has access to a Decision-DH oracle, the probability of, given (g^a, g^b) , finding $C = g^{ab}$ is negligible.*

Since no polynomial time reduction (even a probabilistic one) is known from the Computational-DH to the Decision-DH problems, the Gap-DH assumption seems as reasonable as the Decision-DH assumption due to the duality of these problems (Proposition 4.2). Note that, as for most of the problems in use in cryptography, the Inverting Problem is stronger than the Gap Problem (and the Decision Problem either). Therefore, the tractability of the Gap-DH problem would lead to an equivalence between Computational-DH and Decision-DH (they would be reducible to each other), which is very unlikely.

Definition 4.7 (The Rabin Problems) *Let us consider $n = pq$. We define three problems as follows:*

- The Inverting Rabin Problem (*a.k.a. the Factoring Problem*): *given a pair (n, y) , find $x = y^{1/2} \pmod n$ if x exists.*
- The Decision Rabin Problem (*a.k.a the Quadratic Residuosity Problem*): *given a pair (n, y) , decide whether x exists or not.*
- The Gap Rabin Problem: *given a pair (n, y) , find $x = y^{1/2} \pmod n$ if x exists, with the help of a Decision Rabin Oracle.*

Note that these decision and gap problems are of type 2, where

$$f(y, x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left(y \stackrel{?}{=} x^2 \pmod{n} \right),$$

which is a polynomially computable function.

Since no polynomial time reduction is known from the Factorization to the Quadratic-Residuosity problem, the Gap-Rabin assumption seems as reasonable as the Quadratic-Residuosity assumption.

Definition 4.8 (The RSA Problems) *Let us consider $n = pq$ and e relatively prime with $\varphi(n)$. We define three problems as follows:*

- The Inverting RSA Problem: *given a triple (n, e, y) , find $x = y^{1/e} \pmod{n}$.*
- The Decision RSA Problem: *given a quadruple (n, e, y, x) , decide whether $x = y^{1/e} \pmod{n}$.*
- The Gap RSA Problem: *given a triple (n, e, y) , find $x = y^{1/e} \pmod{n}$ with the help of a Decision RSA Oracle.*

Note that these decision and gap problems are of type 1, where

$$f(y, x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left(y \stackrel{?}{=} x^e \pmod{n} \right),$$

which is a polynomially computable function. Therefore, it is a really different situation from the Diffie-Hellman problems. They are both type 1 problems, but in the current RSA situation, the function f is polynomially computable. Thus the Decision-problem is clearly strongly tractable (and even more than that since one can always answer correctly). As a consequence, the Gap and Inverting-RSA problems are equivalent.

Definition 4.9 (The Okamoto-Uchiyama Problems) *Let us consider $n = p^2q$, $g \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ such that $g_p^{-1} \pmod{p^2}$ is of order p , and $h = g^n \pmod{n}$. We define three problems as follows:*

- The Inverting-OU Problem (*a.k.a. the Factoring Problem*): *given a quadruple (n, g, h, y) , find $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ such that $y = g^x h^r \pmod{n}$.*
- The Decision-OU Problem (*a.k.a. the High-Residuosity Problem*): *given a tuple (n, g, h, y, x) , decide whether $y = g^x h^r \pmod{n}$ for some r , or not.*
- The Gap-OU Problem (*thus called the Gap-High-Residuosity Problem*): *given a quadruple (n, g, h, y) , find $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ such that $y = g^x h^r \pmod{n}$ with the help of a Decision-OU Oracle.*

Note that these decision and gap problems are of type 1, where f is a first order function:

$$f(y, x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left(\exists r, y \stackrel{?}{=} g^x h^r \pmod{n} \right),$$

which is *a priori* not a polynomially computable function.

Definition 4.10 (The Gap-High-Residuosity Assumption) *For any probabilistic polynomial oracle Turing machine, which has access to a High-Residuosity Oracle, the probability of success in factoring is negligible.*

Since no polynomial time reduction from Factorization to the High-Residuosity problem, the Gap-High Residuosity assumption seems as reasonable as the High-Residuosity assumption.

5 Description of the Conversion

5.1 The Basic Conversion

Let us consider $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{asym}})$, any INV-PCA-secure asymmetric encryption scheme, as well as two given hash functions G and H which output k_1 -bit strings and k_2 -bit strings respectively. Then, the new scheme $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ works as follows:

- Key generation algorithm $\mathcal{K}(1^k)$: it simply runs $\mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}(1^k)$ to get a pair of keys (sk, pk) , and outputs it.
- Encryption algorithm $\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}(m; R, r)$: it gets $c_1 = \mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(R; r)$, then it computes the session key $K = G(R)$, $c_2 = K \oplus m$ as well as $c_3 = H(c_1, R, m)$. The ciphertext consists of the triple $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$.
- Decryption algorithm $\mathcal{D}_{\text{sk}}(C)$: from $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$, it first extracts R from c_1 by decrypting it: $R = \mathcal{D}_{\text{sk}}^{\text{asym}}(c_1)$. It can therefore recover the session key $K = G(R)$ and $m = K \oplus c_2$ which is output only if $c_3 = H(c_1, R, m)$. Otherwise, it outputs “Reject”.

The overload is minimal. Indeed, if we consider the encryption phase, it just adds the computation of two hash values and an XOR. Concerning the decryption phase, which had been made heavy in previous conversions [13, 14, 27] with a re-encryption to check the validity, we also just add the computation of two hash values and an XOR, as in the encryption process.

5.2 The Hybrid Conversion

As it has already been done with some previous conversions [13, 14, 22, 25, 27], the “one-time pad” encryption can be generalized to any symmetric encryption scheme which is not perfectly secure, but semantically secure against passive attacks.

Let us consider two encryption schemes, $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{asym}})$ is a INV-PCA-secure asymmetric scheme and $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{sym}})$ is a IND-secure symmetric scheme which uses k_1 -bit long keys, as well as two hash functions G and H which output k_1 -bit numbers and k_2 -bit numbers respectively. Then, the new scheme $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{hyb}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{hyb}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{hyb}})$ works as follows:

- Key generation algorithm $\mathcal{K}^{\text{hyb}}(1^k)$: it simply runs $\mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}(1^k)$ to get a pair of keys (sk, pk) , and outputs it.
- Encryption algorithm $\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{hyb}}(m; R, r)$: it gets $c_1 = \mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}(R; r)$ and a random session key $K = G(R)$. Then it computes $c_2 = \mathcal{E}_K^{\text{sym}}(m)$ as well as the checking part $c_3 = H(c_1, R, m)$. The ciphertext consists of $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$.
- Decryption algorithm $\mathcal{D}_{\text{sk}}^{\text{hyb}}(C)$: from $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$, it first extracts R from c_1 by decrypting it: $R = \mathcal{D}_{\text{sk}}^{\text{asym}}(c_1)$. It can therefore recover the session key $K = G(R)$ as well as the plaintext $m = \mathcal{D}_K^{\text{sym}}(c_2)$ which is output only if $c_3 = H(c_1, R, m)$. Otherwise, it outputs “Reject”.

The overload is similar to the previous, but then, the plaintext can be longer. Such an hybrid transformation cannot be just considered as folklore since the OAEP conversion (which furthermore requires a trapdoor permutation) does not allow symmetric encryption integration. Furthermore, the required property for the symmetric encryption is very weak. Indeed, as it will be seen during the security analysis in next section, it is just required that the symmetric encryption scheme is semantic security in the basic scenario (no plaintext/ciphertext attacks).

5.3 Chosen-Ciphertext Security

Theorem 5.1 *Let us assume that*

- *the asymmetric encryption scheme $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{asym}})$ is INV-PCA-secure¹*
- *and the symmetric encryption scheme $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{sym}})$ is IND-secure,*

then the conversion $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{hyb}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{hyb}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{hyb}})$ is IND-CCA in the random oracle model.

More precisely, one can claim the following exact security result.

Theorem 5.2 *Let us consider a CCA-adversary \mathcal{A}^{cca} against the “semantic security” of the conversion $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{hyb}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{hyb}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{hyb}})$, between ℓ -bit messages, within a time bounded by t , with advantage ε , after q_D , q_G and q_H queries to the decryption oracle, and the hash functions G and H respectively. Then for any $0 < \nu < \varepsilon$, there either exist*

- *an adversary \mathcal{B}^{cca} against the (t, φ) -INV-PCA-security of the asymmetric encryption scheme $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{asym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{asym}})$, after less than $(q_G + q_H) \cdot (q_D + 1)$ queries to the Plaintext-Checking Oracle, where*

$$\varphi = \frac{\varepsilon - \nu}{2} - \frac{q_D}{2^{k_2}}$$

- *or an adversary \mathcal{B} against the (t, ν, ℓ) -IND-security of symmetric encryption scheme $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{sym}})$.*

¹In other words, “If the type 1 Gap problem is intractable (where $f(y, x) = 1$ iff $\mathcal{D}^{\text{asym}}(y) = x$)”

Proof:

More than semantically secure under chosen-ciphertext attacks, this converted scheme can be proven “plaintext-aware” [3, 2], which implies chosen-ciphertext security. To prove above Theorems, we first assume that the symmetric encryption scheme $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{sym}})$ is (t, ν, ℓ) -IND-secure, for some probability $0 < \nu < \varepsilon$.

Semantic Security. The semantic security of this scheme intuitively comes from the fact that for any adversary, in order to have any information about the encrypted message m , she at least has to have asked (c_1, R, \star) to H (which is called “event 1” and denoted by E_1) or R to G (which is called “event 2” and denoted by E_2). Therefore, for a given $c_1 = \mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(R; r)$, R is in the list of queries asked to G or H . Then, for any candidate \tilde{R} , one asks to the Plaintext Checking Oracle whether c_1 encrypts \tilde{R} or not. The accepted one is output as the inversion of $\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}$ on the ciphertext c_1 , which breaks the INV-PCA.

More precisely, let us consider $\mathcal{A} = (A_1, A_2)$, an adversary against the semantic security of the converted scheme, using an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. Within a time bound t , she asks q_D queries to the decryption oracle and q_G and q_H queries to the hash functions G and H respectively, and distinguishes the right plaintext with an advantage greater than ε . Actually, in the random oracle model, because of the randomness of G and H , if neither event 1 nor event 2 happen, she gets $c_2 = \mathcal{E}_K^{\text{sym}}(m_b)$, for a totally random key K and then cannot gain any advantage greater than ν , since the running time is bounded by t and messages are ℓ -bit long. Then,

$$\Pr_b[A_2(\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{hyb}}(m_b; r), s) = b \mid \neg(E_1 \vee E_2)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\nu}{2}.$$

However,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} &\leq \Pr_b[A_2(\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{hyb}}(m_b; r), s) = b] \\ &= \Pr_b[A_2 = b \wedge \neg(E_1 \vee E_2)] + \Pr_b[A_2 = b \wedge (E_1 \vee E_2)] \\ &= \Pr_b[A_2 = b \mid \neg(E_1 \vee E_2)] \times \Pr_b[\neg(E_1 \vee E_2)] + \Pr_b[A_2 = b \wedge (E_1 \vee E_2)] \\ &\leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\nu}{2} + \Pr_b[E_1 \vee E_2]. \end{aligned}$$

This leads to $\Pr[E_1 \vee E_2] \geq (\varepsilon - \nu)/2$. If E_1 or E_2 occurred, an \tilde{R} will be accepted and returned after at most $(q_G + q_H)$ queries to the Plaintext Checking Oracle.

Plaintext-Extractor. Since we are in an adaptive chosen-ciphertext scenario, we have to simulate the decryption oracle, or to provide a plaintext-extractor. When the adversary asks a query (c_1, c_2, c_3) , the simulator looks for the triples (m, R, K) in the table of the query/answer’s previously got from the hash functions G and H , using c_1 , which one both led to c_2 and c_3 . For any correct one, it asks to the Plaintext-Checking Oracle whether c_1 encrypts the given

R (therefore globally at most q_H). In the positive case, it has found a triple (m, R, K) such that, $K = G(R)$ and for some r' , $c_1 = \mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}^{\text{asym}}(R; r')$, $c_2 = \mathcal{E}_K^{\text{sym}}(m)$ and $c_3 = H(c_1, R, m)$. The corresponding plaintext is therefore m .

Some decryptions may be incorrect, but only refusing a valid ciphertext: a ciphertext is refused if the query R has not been directly asked to G by the attacker, or (c_1, R, m) not asked to H . This may happen in two situations:

- the attacker has guessed the right value for $H(c_1, R, m)$ without having asked for it, but only with probability $1/2^{k_2}$;
- the c_3 has been given directly by the encryption oracle, which means that it is a part of the challenge ciphertext. Because of c_1 , R and m in the triple H -input, the decryption oracle query would either be exactly the challenge ciphertext, which is not allowed to the attacker, or a non-valid ciphertext.

Using this plaintext-extractor, we obtain,

$$\Pr[(E_1 \vee E_2) \wedge \text{no incorrect decryption}] \geq \frac{\varepsilon - \nu}{2} - \frac{q_D}{2^{k_2}},$$

in which cases one solves the Inverting-problem, simply using the Decision-problem oracle to check which element, in the list of queries asked to G and H , is the solution. [QED] ¶

6 Some Examples

We now apply this conversion to many classical encryption schemes which are clearly INV-PCA under some well defined assumptions.

6.1 The RSA Encryption Scheme

6.1.1 Description of the Original Scheme.

In 1978, Rivest–Shamir–Adleman [29] defined the first asymmetric encryption based on the RSA–assumption. It works as follows:

- The user chooses two large primes p and q and publishes the product $n = pq$ together with any exponent e , relatively prime to $\varphi(n)$. He keeps p and q secret, or the invert exponent $d = e^{-1} \bmod \varphi(n)$.
- To encrypt a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, one just has to compute $c = m^e \bmod n$.
- The recipient can recover the message thanks to d , $m = c^d \bmod n$.

The *one-wayness* of this scheme relies on the RSA assumption. Since this scheme is deterministic, it is still one-way, even against CPA, relative to the RSA assumption.

6.1.2 The Converted Scheme: OCAC–RSA.

Let us consider two hash functions G and H which output k_1 -bit numbers and k_2 -bit numbers respectively, and any semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{sym}})$.

- Key generation algorithm $\mathcal{K}(1^k)$: it chooses two large primes p and q greater than 2^k , computes the product $n = pq$. A key pair is composed by a random exponent e , relatively prime to $\varphi(n)$ and its inverse $d = e^{-1} \bmod \varphi(n)$.
- Encryption algorithm $\mathcal{E}_{e,n}(m; R)$: with $R \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, it gets $c_1 = R^e \bmod n$, then it computes $K = G(R)$ and $c_2 = \mathcal{E}_K^{\text{sym}}(m)$ as well as $c_3 = H(c_1, R, m)$. The ciphertext consists of the triple $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$.
- Decryption algorithm $\mathcal{D}_{d,n}(c_1, c_2, c_3)$, it first extracts $R = c_1^d \bmod n$. Then it recovers $K = G(R)$ and $m = \mathcal{D}_K^{\text{sym}}(c_2)$ which is output if and only if $c_3 = H(c_1, R, m)$. Otherwise, it outputs “Reject”.

Theorem 6.1 *The OCAC–RSA encryption scheme is IND-CCA in the random oracle model, under the RSA assumption (and the semantic security of the symmetric encryption scheme under the basic passive attack).*

This becomes the best alternative to OAEP–RSA [3, 30], since \mathcal{E}^{sym} can simply be the “one-time pad” but also any semantically secure encryption scheme to provide high-speed rates.

6.2 The El Gamal Encryption Scheme

6.2.1 Description of the Original Scheme.

In 1985, El Gamal [12] defined an asymmetric encryption scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman key distribution problem [10]. It works as follows:

- An authority chooses and publishes an Abelian group \mathcal{G} of order q , denoted multiplicatively but it could be an elliptic curve, together with a generator g . Each user chooses a secret key x in \mathbb{Z}_q^* and publishes $y = g^x$.
- To encrypt a message m , one has to choose a random element k in \mathbb{Z}_q^* and sends the pair $(r = g^k \bmod p, s = m \times y^k)$ as the ciphertext.
- The recipient can recover the message from a pair (r, s) since $m = s/r^x$, where x is his secret key.

To reach semantic security, this scheme requires m to be encoded by an element in the group \mathcal{G} . Whereas the *one-wayness* of this scheme anyway relies on the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem.

Lemma 6.2 *The El Gamal encryption scheme is INV-PCA under the Gap-DH Assumption.*

Proof:

This lemma is clear since a Plaintext-Checking Oracle, for a given public key $y = g^x$ and a ciphertext $(r = g^k, s = m \times y^k)$, simply checks whether the triple $(y = g^x, r = g^k, s/m)$ is a DH-triple. It is exactly a Decision Diffie-Hellman Oracle. [QED] \blacksquare

6.2.2 The Converted Scheme: OCAC–El Gamal.

Let us consider two hash functions G and H which output k_1 -bit numbers and k_2 -bit numbers respectively, and any semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{sym}})$.

- Key generation algorithm $\mathcal{K}(1^k)$: it chooses a large prime q , greater than 2^k , a subgroup \mathcal{G} of order q of an Abelian group \mathcal{G}' and a generator g of \mathcal{G} . A key pair is composed by a random element x in \mathbb{Z}_q^* and $y = g^x$.
- Encryption algorithm $\mathcal{E}_y(m; R, r)$: with $R \in \mathcal{G}'$ and $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, it gets $c_1 = g^r$ and $c'_1 = R \times y^r$ in \mathcal{G}' , then it computes $K = G(R)$ and $c_2 = \mathcal{E}_K^{\text{sym}}(m)$ as well as $c_3 = H(c_1, c'_1, R, m)$. The ciphertext consists of the tuple $C = (c_1, c'_1, c_2, c_3)$.
- Decryption algorithm $\mathcal{D}_x(c_1, c'_1, c_2, c_3)$, it first extracts $R = c'_1/c_1^x$. Then it recovers $K = G(R)$ and $m = \mathcal{D}_K^{\text{sym}}(c_2)$ which is output if and only if $c_3 = H(c_1, c'_1, R, m)$. Otherwise, it outputs “Reject”.

Theorem 6.3 *The OCAC–El Gamal encryption scheme is IND-CCA in the random oracle model, under the Gap-DH assumption (and the semantic security of the symmetric encryption scheme under the basic passive attack).*

6.3 The Okamoto-Uchiyama Encryption Scheme

6.3.1 Description of the Original Scheme.

Last year, Okamoto–Uchiyama [21] defined an asymmetric encryption based on a trapdoor discrete logarithm. It works as follows:

- Each user chooses two large primes p and q and computes $n = p^2q$. He also chooses an element $g \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ such that $g^{p-1} \bmod p^2$ is of order p and computes $h = g^n \bmod n$. The modulus n , and the elements g and h are made public while p and q are kept secret.
- To encrypt a message m , smaller than p , one has to choose a random element $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and sends $c = g^m h^r \bmod n$ as the ciphertext.
- The recipient can recover the message m from c since $m = L(c_p)/L(g_p) \bmod p$, where $L(x) = (x-1)/p \bmod p$ for any $x = 1 \bmod p$, and $c_p = c^{p-1} \bmod p^2$.

The *semantic security* of this scheme relies on the p -subgroup assumption (a.k.a. p -residuosity or more generally high-residuosity), while the *one-wayness* relies on the factorization of the modulus n . The INV-PCA relies on the gap problem (Gap-High-Residuosity).

However, since the encryption process is public, the bound p is unknown. A public bound has to be defined, for example $n^{1/4}$ which is clearly smaller than p , or 2^k where $2^k < p, q < 2^{k+1}$.

Lemma 6.4 *The Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption scheme is INV-PCA under the Gap-High-Residuosity Assumption.*

Proof:

This lemma is clear since a Plaintext-Checking Oracle is exactly a high-residuosity oracle. [QED] ¶

6.3.2 The Converted Scheme: OCAC–Okamoto-Uchiyama

Let us consider two hash functions G and H which output k_1 -bit numbers and k_2 -bit numbers respectively, and any semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme $(\mathcal{K}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{E}^{\text{sym}}, \mathcal{D}^{\text{sym}})$.

- Key generation algorithm $\mathcal{K}(1^k)$: it chooses two large primes p and q greater than 2^k , as well as g as described above. It then computes $n = p^2q$ and $h = g^n \bmod n$.
- Encryption algorithm $\mathcal{E}_{n,g,h}(m; R, r)$: with $R < 2^k$ and $r < 2^{3k}$, it gets $c_1 = g^R h^r \bmod n$, then it computes $K = G(R)$ and $c_2 = \mathcal{E}_K^{\text{sym}}(m)$ as well as $c_3 = H(c_1, R, m)$. The ciphertext consists of the triple $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$.
- Decryption algorithm $\mathcal{D}_p(c_1, c_2, c_3)$, it first extracts $R = L(c_{1p})/L(g_p)$. Then it recovers $K = G(R)$ and $m = \mathcal{D}_K^{\text{sym}}(c_2)$ which is output if and only if $R < 2^k$ and $c_3 = H(c_1, R, m)$. Otherwise, it outputs “Reject”.

Theorem 6.5 *The OCAC–Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption scheme is IND-CCA in the random oracle model, under the Gap-High-Residuosity assumption (and the semantic security of the symmetric encryption scheme under the basic passive attack).*

7 Conclusion

This paper presented OCAC, an optimal conversion which applies to any weakly secure cryptosystem: the overload is as negligible as OAEP, and advantages of OCAC beyond OAEP are numerous. Therefore, OCAC provides an optimal solution to realize a provably secure (in the strongest security sense) asymmetric or hybrid encryption schemes based on any practical asymmetric encryption primitive such as RSA, El Gamal, or Elliptic-Curve El Gamal. In addition, this paper introduced a novel class of computational problems, the *gap problems*, which is considered to be dual to the class of the *decision problems*.

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